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Abstract 
The investors’ shift towards shares, in the late 1990s drove stock prices 
up to unduly high levels in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). On the 
other hand companies listed in the ASE were attracted to equity finance. 
There was a significant gap of perception between investors and companies 
regarding the cost of equity. The return on stock investment expected by in-
vestors between 1995 and 1999 was around 70%, yet, for companies the visi-
ble cost of equity, practically equal to the dividend yield, was about 1%. 
Such a gap can be explained by the problematic system of corporate govern-
ance and the inefficiency of the Greek stock market. The Greek governance 
system, traditionally based on the monitoring role of financial interme-
diation, lack the norms to provide adequate protection for minority interests 
in the context of the new trend favoring fund raising through the stock mar-
ket. Preference of equity over debt reduced considerably control over the use 
of funds and the accountability of controlling owners to the providers of 
capital, allowing for misuse of resources. On the other hand, investors dared 
to invest in stocks that yielded dividends of about 1% in the late 1990s due to 
market inefficiency created by some form of irrational investors’ behavior 
based on "overreaction" and ‘feedback trading". The current slump of the 
stock market is changing the original perception. Weakness in investor’s 
protection affects access to finance, cost of capital and ultimately eco-
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nomic growth. Companies pay the price for their excess finance in the past 
and controlling owners face up to the true cost of equity. The true cost of 
equity emerges by the responsibilities to shareholders not only in terms of 
dividends, but also capital gains which investors expect. Corporate govern-
ance reform has become the new rhetoric in Greece, but it continues to 
separate capital contribution from control. However, with such a corpo-
rate governance and declining corporate’s profits, companies are unable 
to placate once again investors.  
JEL Classification: G14, G34. 
Keywords:  
Capital Markets, Corporate Governance, Market Efficiency. 
Introduction 
The main features of the Greek stock market in 1999 were the impressive 
increase in both share prices and the value of transactions, as well as substan-
tial fund-raising. The rise in prices was particularly steep between early Au-
gust and mid-September 1999 (when the index peaked to 6.355 points), but 
both prices and trading volume fell considerably thereafter, albeit with sharp 
fluctuations. However, despite the downward shift in the last three months of 
that year, the composite Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) share price index 
rose by 102.2% between end-December 1998 and end-December 1999. This 
increase compared to a 25.2% rise in the Dow Jones index and increases of 
17.8%, 39.1% and 51.1% of the basic indices of the London, Frankfurt and 
Paris stock exchanges respectively.  
Due to ever-rising stock prices in the late 1990s, Greek companies raised 
huge amounts of money at a very low cost from the capital market. In fact, 
for managers of Greek companies, the late 1990s was one of the best periods 
in their history. Soaring stock markets helped them raise as much money as 
they wanted by issuing equities. Stock investments were very attractive to 
investors who used to believe that there would be no end to the prosperity of 
the capital market. Companies could raise as much money as they liked very 
cheaply.  
Banks found that major corporations were reluctant to take out bank 
loans because of their relatively high cost compared to equity financing. 
Banks needed to find new clients to borrow from them. The new clients 
turned out to be smaller companies or individuals who did not have a direct 
access to the financial market. 
The huge amount of money raised either by equity financing or bank 
borrowing was invested in various forms. Companies invested the money in 
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their facilities to increase productive capacity. The financed amount, how-
ever, was so big that these actual investment needs of companies were not 
enough. The money had to find its place among investment in stock market. 
In those days, investors somehow came to believe that (the) prices would 
never go down in this market. Supported by these developments, money con-
tinued to flow into the stock market and pushed the prices higher, which in 
turn made (even cheaper) equity financing available to Greek companies 
even cheaper.  
 Since September 1999 share prices on the ASE followed a severe 
downward course with considerable fluctuations. In the year 2000, the com-
posite ASE share prices index fell (by) 38.8% and in 2001 (by) another 
23.5%. The downward trend of share prices continued in 2002 as well and 
the composite ASE index fell (by) 30 %. The drop in share prices caused the 
ASE P/E ratio to fall to a level among the lowest worldwide, in contrast to its 
rather high level at the end of 1999. The above developments affected Greek 
companies. The stock market (is) was in a slump and the new issue of equity 
(is) was very difficult, if not impossible. Many people tried to explain this 
dramatic drop of stock prices. The most common argument was that the 
stock price boom of the late eighties was a speculative bubble that was des-
tined to burst eventually. Does the evidence support this view?  
The aim of this paper is to analyze and provide the rationale for the ex-
tra-ordinary developments in the ASE. From this analysis the true cost of 
equity emerges. The analysis also allows the opportunity to look at the pros-
pects of the Greek stock market and make policy recommendations. The pa-
per is organized as follows. The second part identifies a considerable gap of 
perceptions between managers and investors about the cost of equity in the 
late 1990s. The third part explains partly this gap by looking at the corporate 
governance system and the protection provided to investors. The forth part 
examines the market inefficiency of the ASE. The fifth part analyses the im-
pact of stock market on economic developments. Finally the concluding part 
contains the prospects and the policy recommendations. 
2. The Gap of Perceptions between Managers and Investors Concerning 
the Cost of Equity 
Greek managers have seldom been aware of the true cost of their equity. 
The slump of the stock market and the difficulty of equity finance, however, 
provided managers with a rare opportunity to realize that the true cost of 
their equity is higher than they (have) had thought. In fact there was a sig-
nificant gap of perception between Greek managers and investors about the 
cost of equity while the current slump of the stock market is changing the 
perception. In the mid 1990s when the stock market continued to break the 
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record high, few people dreamed of the current slump in the market. How-
ever, after the stock market slump managers started reassess the true cost of 
equity of a company. 
2.1 Methods of Estimation  
Theoretically, the cost of equity is the opportunity cost of money that is 
invested in equities. There are different methods to estimate the opportunity 
cost, reflecting a different perception of the opportunity cost itself. The first 
approach is to use the historical data on equity returns: i.e. calculate the capi-
tal gain portion of equity and add the average dividend yield to get the total 
return of investment in stocks. The difficult part of the method is to decide 
the length of the period over which one will calculate the return on equity. If 
the period is too short, the calculated returns fluctuate dramatically depend-
ing on specific events or economic trends making the estimation meaning-
less. If the period is too long, the figure would not take into account the re-
cent changes of required returns. It is desirable that the period should coin-
cide with that of investors' horizons of stock investment. This is the opportu-
nity cost of capital that investors pay. The underline assumption of this 
method is that investors estimate how much they can expect from investing 
in stocks by looking back at the past and hope that stocks will continue to 
earn roughly the same return. Using this method it was estimated that the 
return on stock investment expected by investors between 1995 and 1999 
was more than 70% in nominal terms.  
Another method is to use the sustainable growth rate for dividends as an 
estimation of the cost of equity. This method assumes the dividends will 
grow in the future at a constant rate. It reflects a different perception of the 
cost of equity. Once issued equity is money that a company does not have to 
reimburse, but instead pays dividends for. The visible cost of equity is practi-
cally equal to the dividend yield. This perception reflects the managers’ view 
of the cost of equity since managers seemed to regard dividends as the only 
price they pay for issuing equity. The dividend payout ratio of a share in the 
late 1990s was about 1% in nominal terms (Athens Stock Exchange, 2001). 
Obviously there was a considerable gap between what investors expected 
by investing in stocks and what managers thought they paid in return for is-
suing stocks. Such a gap seems to have persisted for quite some time, al-
though it was remarkably bigger during the late nineties and could be ex-
plained by the system of corporate governance and the inefficiency of the 
Greek stock market. These two factors are considered in turn. 
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3. Corporate Governance 
In this part we will provide evidence that in Greece, preference of equity 
over debt in corporate financing reduces considerably control over the use of 
funds and the accountability of managers to the providers of capital. For this 
purpose it is essential to analyze how the various corporate governance ar-
rangements protect investors. Then in the light of this analysis the Greek 
corporate governance system is considered. 
3.1. Differences in Corporate Governance Systems 
Corporate governance essentially involves the control of the corporation 
and the purpose of such control. It is mainly a large corporation issue, since 
shareholders may delegate business decision and operation to managers. This 
is the principal agent problem of separation of ownership and control since 
their respective interest may diverge (Blair, 1995). Effective corporate gov-
ernance makes management accountable to financiers and gives them proper 
incentives to take the goals set by the providers of capital into account, while 
preserving managerial autonomy to formulate strategies that enhance the per-
formance of companies.   
Too high degree of managerial discretion provides opportunities to man-
agers to waste free cash flow on activities with a potential for managerial 
empire-building such as investment in large offices, or in staff developments, 
launching of over-extensive advertising campaigns or acquisitions (Prowse, 
1994; Yafeh and Yosha, 1995). Free cash flows concern earnings of the 
company that exceed the funds needed for investments by the companies in 
projects with a positive net present value. Managers may also pursue their 
own goals by writing contracts or making investments specific to their ability 
and presence (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). These investments are costly to be 
replaced (La Porta et al 1996). Higher ownership concentration and lack of 
protection for minority shareholders deters potential investors and may imply 
higher cost of capital in terms of both diversification opportunities forgone 
and less liquid markets for corporate finance. 
On the other hand, excessive managerial control may contain managerial 
initiative. The optimal level of investor’s protection remains an empirical 
issue. Different financial and corporate governance systems are distinguished 
mainly by the relative importance of markets and institutions in monitoring 
the use of funds and the respective protection provided to investors, rather 
than their role in the supply of funds (Berglof, 2001, Allen and Gale, 2000).  
Broadly speaking, (two generic forms of finance exist) there are two ge-
neric forms of finance that have important implications (for) in the corporate 
governance of individual firms. The arm’s-length finance and the control 
oriented finance. In the case of the arm’s-length finance, mainly associated 
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with the UK., the financial markets are large and highly liquid, the share of 
firms listed on the exchanges large, ownership of debt and equity dispersed, 
investors are portfolio oriented and the role of hostile takeovers important. In 
this system the dominant agency problem is between shareholders vs. man-
agement. In the case of control oriented finance, which is best represented by 
Germany, the financial markets are small and illiquid, the share of firms 
listed on the exchanges small, ownership of debt and equity concentrated, 
investors are controlled oriented the role of financial intermediation impor-
tant and the role of hostile takeovers very limited. In this system the domi-
nant agency problem is between controlling (vs.) and minority shareholdings 
Differences in the generic form of finance are strongly connected with 
(to) distinguished corporate law systems. In Europe two broad corporate law 
systems can be distinguished. A company based and an enterprise based sys-
tem. In the former, which is connected with (to) the arm’s-length finance, the 
emphasis is on the firm as a legal entity and its relationship with its investors. 
In this system the stock market provides an objective valuation of the firm 
and mainly through its takeover mechanism protects shareholders against the 
abuses of management. In an enterprise based system, which is connected 
with (to) the control oriented finance, the focus is on the physical entity such 
as equipment, plant, workers, etc., while the investors are considered equally 
important with the other stakeholders. The role of the stock market is limited. 
Management to some extent is monitored by the supervisory board, which 
appoints the management board. The interests of all stakeholders are taken 
into account as in large companies, half of the supervisory boards’ members 
are appointed by employees, and half by the controlling owners. However, 
the management is monitored by the commercial banks that in some cases 
hold equity stakes in debtor firms and also votes the proxies of bearer shares 
deposited with them, which provides them with potential control at the gen-
eral shareholders’ meetings.  
Efficient corporate governance can be achieved by both internal and ex-
ternal procedures (Nestor and Thompson 2001). The procedures internal to 
the firm include credible independent auditing, disclosure and transparency 
of corporate performance and monitoring by independent outside directors. 
Since companies would refrain from introducing such measures upon them-
selves, external pressures and sanctions are necessary to force adoption. The 
financial sector is the main external device that provides efficient govern-
ance. However, the procedures that insure monitoring on the use of funds 
differ substantially in these two systems. Shareholders who disagree with the 
way a company is managed have basically three options: exit, voice and re-
placement. All these are considered in turn. 
Exit simply implies selling the company’s shares on the stock market, 
leading to a fall in the share price, which acts as a signal to managers to im-
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prove performance. This “exit” option is useful when the stock market oper-
ates effectively: sufficient liquidity and market transparency, no restrictive 
regulation on the issuance of shares, no taxation on share holdings or share 
trading and not insider dealing (Bolton and Von Thadden, 1995). Minority 
shareholders in a control oriented financial system have fewer opportunities 
to use the “exit” option provided in liquid markets which is the main charac-
teristic of the arm’s-length financial system. Substantial equity ownership by 
institutional investors with a control (and not portfolio) orientation in a con-
trol oriented financial system protects the controlling shareholder (Pound, 
1995). Illiquid markets leave minority interests largely unprotected from the 
abuse of the controlling owner.  
 Voice implies shareholders influencing managers about the appropriate 
way to run the companies either informally or at the general meetings of 
shareholders where votes are taken on a number of important corporate is-
sues. Although for individual shareholders the influence on management is 
small and therefore the cost of exercising voice may outweigh the benefits, 
large institutional investors may be able to exercise control effectively.  
The general meetings elect the board, which act as an intermediary be-
tween minority and majority shareholders. In the case of a company-based 
system –which is associated with (to) the arm’s-length finance, the absence 
of a controlling owner implies that boards of directors are self-appointed. 
Boards tend to be non-executive and independent, without financial stakes, 
but with technical expertise and experience, while in many firms different 
persons hold the positions of the chairman of the board and that of the chief 
executive officer. On the other hand, in an enterprise-based system associ-
ated (with (to) the control oriented finance) management monitoring by su-
pervisory boards is weak (La Porta, et al., 1999). Its competencies are con-
fined to ratifying important managerial decisions. The board does not posses 
a right of initiative: it cannot impose alternative strategies on the manage-
ment, while a number of important management decisions are often not pre-
sented on the board. Although, financial problems with several companies 
have recently reduced confidence in the ability of the supervisory board to 
adequately monitor firms’ performance, it is in the company-based system 
where the board plays a more active role in protecting minority interests. 
Management replacement is the most radical option. This process is ini-
tiated by the decline of share price, (the result of inefficient and incompetent 
management) allowing competing management teams to obtain a majority 
stake in the company at a relatively low cost, replace the current manage-
ment team and improve the company’s performance. The option of manage-
ment replacement is more readily available in an arm’s length financial sys-
tem with liquid financial markets, dispersed ownership of equity and portfo-
lio oriented investors. In contrast the futures of the control oriented finance 
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limit the option of management replacement through hostile takeovers. Be-
cause the majority of shareholders (usually corporation or banks) are control 
oriented who implicitly promised not to sell shares, they constitute an effec-
tive anti-takeover barrier. 
However, the above analysis should not lead to the conclusion that in a 
control oriented financial system the management and controlling sharehold-
ers enjoys a too high degree of discretion.  Bank may substitute and comple-
ment the weak controlling abilities of the illiquid markets and supervisory 
boards in a way to provide ultimately sufficient investors protection in a con-
trol oriented financial and enterprise-based system. 
Banks through an effective control mechanism are able to device and en-
force incentive compatible contracts by, for instance, demanding an equity 
stake in the company (common in some countries), by setting conditions on 
the loan, and by establishing performance clauses for different trances of a 
loan (Allen and Gale, 2000). They can also enforce loan contracts, which 
dispersed lenders often find uneconomic to do, and are able to demand col-
lateral, which enhances the incentive for the borrower to behave prudently 
and in the interest of the provider of capital –i.e. the bank. Thus, banks are 
able to act as a proxy shareholder even without an equity stake. At the same 
time, widely dispersed shareholding may be an inefficient way of exercising 
control. Direct investors would be duplicated monitoring costs and to some 
extent monitoring and evaluation is a public good that no one has an incen-
tive to provide (Burkart, at al., 1995). Thus ultimate lenders choose to dele-
gate such monitoring activity to banks because they have advantages in this 
area. Banks provide the public good of effective monitoring on the use of 
funds even for the interests of minority shareholders. Financial intermedia-
tion could, therefore, be a very efficient monitoring device.  
Theoretically, the distinction between debt and equity in the role of con-
trol should not be drawn too rigidly. The development of rating agencies may 
challenge the role of banks as delegated monitors. Moreover, as shareholding 
in companies becomes more concentrating in the hands of a small number of 
large institutional investors, they in turn are able to exercise control effec-
tively.  Differences in the systems do not necessarily lead to differences in 
the level of investors’ protection.  The various rules and institutions incorpo-
rated in the two systems may substitute and complement each other in ways 
to provide sufficient investors protection. Generally speaking rules and pro-
cedure for minority protection reflects the capital structure of firms and 
the liquidity of markets for the instruments issued. 
Last, but not least, the importance of corporate governance depends on 
the general environment that the firm operates. For instance, competition and 
corporate governance are substitutes implying a correlation between financial 
systems and industrial organization (Aghion et al, 1996). Competition con-
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tains rent-seeking behavior in both output and input markets.  It induces 
management to be efficient and provide all stakeholders (shareholders, credi-
tors, workers) adequate returns (dividends, capital gains, interest, wages) 
both in absolute terms and in relation to the returns received by others. 
3.2. The Greek Corporate Governance System 
The Greek corporate governance system has traditionally been a control 
oriented financial and an enterprise based system. The Greek corporate law 
incorporates only few explicit provisions for the protection of minority inter-
ests. Securities market regulation has largely been neglected. Supervision is 
weak and enforcement rare. Greek authorities have been reluctant to require 
officially organized supervision of public issues other than initial public of-
fering. The regulation of insider dealing and takeover are not explicit. Con-
trol of large corporations is still based on families. The importance of family 
control has not decreased over the last decade, while non-financial corpora-
tions have become block-holders. The same person holds the position of 
chairman in the board and that of chief executive officer. In addition, stake-
holders other than shareholders, such as creditors and employees, are seldom 
represented on the board.  
High concentration of ownership should not be surprising in the case of 
Greece: the shortcomings in the legal system render concentration the only 
way to commit not to steal from the company. Countries with poor protection 
of minority interests tend to have more concentrated ownership structures. 
However, higher ownership concentration may affect access to finance and 
capital costs due to forgone diversification opportunities and illiquid market 
and reduces managerial activism (Cremer, 1995). 
In Greece financial intermediation has traditionally played an important 
role in corporate finance. Banks have, therefore, been the main institutions 
that, through their effective control mechanisms, exercise adequate monitor-
ing on the controlling owners forcing them to behave prudently and in the 
interest of the providers of capital.   
In theory, the willingness to list firms on public exchanges depends 
mainly on the relative cost of attracting capital from the stock market in rela-
tion to the issuing cost and the effects on freedom of action (McLaney, 
2000). Focusing on the latter factor, where equity finance is raised, voting 
power will shift to some extent, perhaps to a large extent, and possibly with it 
control of the firm. However, in the case of Greece firms listing in the ASE 
have not reduced the concentration of power and control; in fact, as it will be 
pointed out below, they have increased the controlling owners’ freedom of 
action.  
Ordinary shares typically carry voting rights. In theory, public offering 
of such shares would reduce the original shareholders’ power and control. 
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However, typical ordinary shareholders seem not to use their votes in any 
case. Most firms’ annual general meetings are characterized by a distinct 
absence of most of those entitled to be present and vote. These meetings elect 
the board, which act as an intermediary between minority and majority 
shareholders. The board exerts limited control over management. In many 
cases the general meeting of owners rather than the board appoints or dis-
misses managers.  
Growing demand for shares in the late 1990s enabled corporations to 
raise substantial amounts of funds through the ASE. Both small and institu-
tional investors become more important to firms for fund raising at the ex-
pense of banks. A more detailed analysis of data related to fund-raising 
through the ASE in 1999 and 2000 indicates that: First, total funds raised by 
companies (excluding banks) exceeded credit expansion (long-term and 
short-term) to the private sector; Second, the sale of existing shares by public 
subscription through the ASE was also high for the same period; Third the 
ratio of own to borrowed funds increased substantially as many firms used 
the funds raised by the ASE to repay past loans.  
Since the stock market started to play a more active role in corporate fi-
nance, the relative importance of traditional banking together with its effec-
tive monitoring role declined. In the late 1990s fund raising activity in the 
ASE challenged the role of banks as delegated monitors. However, the ero-
sion of banks monitoring on management and controlling shareholders has 
not been substituted and complemented by other institutions, rules or proce-
dures. Thus, controlling owners found themselves in a position to enjoy a too 
high degree of managerial discretion.   
As it has been pointed out, rules and procedure for minority protec-
tion reflects the capital structure of firms and the liquidity of markets for 
the instruments issued. In the late 1990s, the capital structure of firms 
changed and the balanced shifted in favor to equity against debt. Yet, the 
Greek corporate governance system, being essentially an enterprise-based 
system, lack the rules and procedures to provide adequate protection for mi-
nority interest in the light of the new trend favoring fund raising through the 
stock market. An enterprise-based system can provide adequate monitor-
ing on the use of funds and therefore protection for minority interests 
when it is connected with a control-oriented finance; but it’s totally inap-
propriate to achieve this task in an arm’s length financial system which 
seems to be adopted by Greece in the late 1990s.    
Corporate holding of stock is one of the most remarkable features of the 
Greek stock market. Companies hold shares of firms closely related to them 
and have their shares held by them in return. This cross-holding is designed 
not only to stabilize the share ownership but also to ensure the close relation-
ship between companies. Cross-holding is an important element of company 
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groups that maintain close business ties with one another. A chain of firms 
(sometimes as many as ten or fifteen) owns each other create the so-called 
pyramiding. By allowing the ultimate owner to minimize its capital stake 
without affecting its influence on the respective firm, pyramiding is an effec-
tive device to separate capital contribution from control. In addition to strong 
cross-holding arrangements, the government has maintained and intends to 
maintain potential influence in large privatized firms through golden shares. 
Large concentration of shareholdings are in the hands of founding fami-
lies or other enterprises which, because of their long-term attachment to the 
company, choose the side of management and refuse to sell to a hostile bid-
der. As a result managers have little to worry about even if they could not 
meet the expected returns of investors. Stable shareholders expect more from 
this long-term business relationship and its consequent benefit than from the 
direct returns on stock investment. This is why managers regard dividends as 
the only cost for issuing equity. Managers do not have to take the share price 
of their company too seriously because the fear of hostile takeover hardly 
exists. Takeovers are used as a mechanism to withdraw firms from the stock 
exchange rather as a device to change control. Few hostile takeovers have 
been attempted and not a single one has succeeded. The market for corporate 
control operates outside the public exchange in the form of trades in large 
blocks and the terms in the case of control changes are negotiated between 
the controlling owner and the outside investor.  
The Greek corporate governance process, based on friendly ownership 
stakes, insulates management from the pressure of external shareholders 
seeking improved total returns. However, protected against unwanted take-
over efforts and institutional investor dissatisfaction, Greek controlling own-
ers have no incentives to undertake a self-restructuring, seek an acceptable 
merger partner (‘white Knight”), payout special dividends or find other ways 
to enhance shareholders value and efficiency in the use of capital to preclude 
the emergence of hostile action. Such managerial autonomy allows managers 
to capture the rents from ordinary shareholders.  
In an arm’s length finance connected with an enterprise-based system 
the market cannot impose discipline, for example, by replacing management 
following poor performance or closing down unprofitable units. The market 
cannot provide an objective valuation of the firm (this is discussed in more 
details latter on) nor can protect minority shareholders against the abuses of 
controlling owners.  
Anti-take over defenses used by controlling owners to protect themselves 
against hostile takeovers leaves scope for moral hazard -broadly defined to 
include excessive risk taking, waste cash flow and other forms of misman-
agement- and eventually drives down share prices (Franks, et al., 1995). The 
depressed present state of the ASE is partly explained by the typical share-
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holders’ unwillingness to invest in a market where the controlling owner can 
exercise their own terms. With corporate control in the hands of insiders, 
Greek firms find it difficult to  outside finance. Without outside finance, and 
the pressure from outside investors, little deep restructuring and strategic 
investment, in response to changes in technology, market competition and 
other fundamentals, are taking place.  
The deficiency of the Greek corporate governance system reflects the ba-
sic agency (credibility) problem facing entrepreneurs or firms when they 
seek outside investors to contribute funds. The financial dimension of corpo-
rate governance evolved from financial intermediation to the stock market, 
which was completely irrelevant in assuming a role in monitoring the use of 
funds. In addition, as it has been pointed out, effective corporate governance 
is particularly important to countries or industries where competition is 
weak. In the case of Greece competition is insufficient to constrain control-
ling owners. 
4. Market Inefficiency 
Although the Greek system of corporate governance explains why man-
agers had regarded the cost of equity as dividends, it does not explain why 
other investors dared to invest in stocks that yielded dividends of about 1% 
in the late 1990s. Greek stock market inefficiency can provide an explana-
tion.  
In an efficient stock market, a stock’s price reflects the current market 
value of its expected future income stream – that is the respective company’s 
fundamental value. In theory, assets are valued by the discounted present 
value of the future cash flow that the respective assets are expected to 
generate (Lumpy and Jones 2001). The discounted cash flow method ap-
plying to the valuation of shares consist (s) the so-called dividend dis-
count model. If stock market is efficient, prices will equal the discounted 
present value of expected future dividends under the assumption of ra-
tional expectations. The dividend discount model implies that stock 
prices are inherently forward-looking i.e. the stock market "trades the 
future". In this case the stock market fulfills its economic function effi-
ciently because investment funds flow to most productive uses. Companies 
with profitable investment opportunities have high fundamental values (and 
high stock prices), while companies without such opportunities have low 
fundamental values (and low stock prices) and as a result the former may 
attract more investment funds, than the latter. The main condition behind 
the hypothesis of market efficiency is that investors have an incentive to 
use all available information and behave rationally.  
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If, however, this condition is not met and if other factors, such as past 
prices, affect the value investors place on stocks, stock prices will deviate 
from fundamental values, sending the wrong signals to market participants 
about the true profitability and risks of certain companies, or even of the 
stock market as a whole (Fama, 1991). Thus a situation of market ineffi-
ciency emerges where relatively unprofitable firms would attract scarce 
financial resources that could have been invested in alternative projects 
with higher productivity or lower risk. 
(More) specifically, market inefficiency is created by some form of 
irrational behavior on the part of at least some investors. This behavior 
based on "investor sentiment" and belief formation (and often defined as 
"overreaction" and "feedback trading") is responsible for bringing stock 
prices out of line with their fundamentals and generating the so-called 
“bubbles” (Brealey and Myers 1999). For instance, a string of positive 
earnings news, lead investors to overly optimistic earnings and dividend 
expectations driving stock prices well above their fundamental values. This 
situation of overreaction results to the so-called "intrinsic bubbles". In 
addition, positive feedback trading generated from investors who believe 
that recent high stocks’ returns (triggered by some extraneous events) are 
likely to be high in the future and therefore buy stocks to capture the excess 
return making these expectations self-fulfilling. Every new wave of inves-
tors brings capital gains to the previous investors giving rise to further ex-
pectations of future price rises creating a pyramid’s scheme where a bub-
ble feeds itself i.e. the so-called "extrinsic bubbles". 
In contrast to an efficient stock market, an inefficient stock market does 
not direct investment funds to their best productive use. Feedback investors 
may irrationally drive the stock prices of companies with low fundamental 
values too high. Conversely, stock prices of companies with high fundamen-
tal values may be too low. Since stock prices overshoot fundamental values, 
the stock market does not direct investment to its most profitable use, leading 
to misallocation of resources. In addition, expected returns may vary over-
time because prices are mean reverting.  
In theory, despite the fact that investors do not all behave rationally, 
stock prices will ultimately return to fundamental values due to the operation 
of an effective arbitrage mechanism. Rational (usually institutional) inves-
tors who pay more attention to fundamental values, for example, can sell 
(or sell short) an "over-priced" security in one market and simultaneously 
buy a security with the same pay-off structure as a hedge in another mar-
ket where it is correctly priced or under-priced. As a result of these ac-
tions equilibrium at the fundamental values in both markets is restored. 
This mechanism operates effectively if stocks have close substitutes. 
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However in the real world such perfect substitutes do not exist. Fun-
damental trading becomes, therefore, risky, since it involves the use of 
imperfect substitutes. In fact, the spread between market and fundamental 
values of shares may widen even further, due to new information con-
cerning the respective securities (the so-called idiosyncratic risk) or due 
to the trading activities of uninformed investors ("noise traders"). 
Borrowing constraints and short investment horizons limits the risk-
bearing capacities of rational investors and consequently their aggregate 
ability (to) in pressing securities prices sufficiently close to their funda-
mental values. The delegated portfolio management and the correspond-
ing agency problems could, for instance, provide a rationale for short in-
vestment horizons. Mutual fund managers may refrain from holding arbi-
trage positions if they do not expect stock prices to converge to their fun-
damental values within the performance evaluation period. In addition 
temporary losses from holding arbitrage positions may induce the fund to 
liquidate arbitrage positions due to irrational behavior of retail investors 
who sell their shares in the fund. 
The Greek stock market is a clear case of market inefficiency. The in-
crease in stock prices has resulted from the combination of an initial overre-
action to intrinsic factors and strong reinforcing factors stemming from the 
influence of positive feed back trading. Initially stock prices were inflated by 
market euphoria concerning economic growth and therefore corporate earn-
ings over the not too distant future. Expectations of a favorable outlook for 
strong and sustainable economic growth were based on several factors, such 
as anticipated price stability and   low investment costs which entail, the euro 
participation, the funds made available under the 3rd Community Support 
Framework (CSF) the beneficial effects of the structural reforms being 
planned in order to enhance the competitiveness of the domestic economy. 
As more and more investors jumped on the bandwagon, stock prices surged 
to unprecedented high levels. 
However, the above favorable developments could not imply that all 
firms listed on the ASE would automatically benefit, if they failed to take 
advantage of the opportunities offered. Furthermore, ASE prices would be 
vulnerable to other factors, such as developments in international capital 
markets or in the exchange rates of major currencies (US dollar, yen, euro), 
as well as raw material and commodity prices. Some of these factors affect 
the various industries asymmetrically leading to different effects on share 
prices. Volatility in share prices of certain enterprises, rather than a continu-
ous increase in stock prices, would therefore be a rational expectation. 
Stock market developments in the course of 1999 reflected to a large ex-
tent the investors’ inadequate information and limited understanding of the 
nature of stock market transactions. During the early August to mid-
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September 1999, investments in the ASE were also made by people who 
were not familiar enough to the key characteristics of the market, particularly 
to the size of the risk inherent in such investment, as well as to the main fac-
tors having a medium-term effect on the price of a specific company’s share. 
The sharp rise in share prices and in the value of transactions was caused by 
the small savers’ increased demand for shares, largely as a result of the mas-
sive entry of new investors into the stock market. In fact, roughly 270,000 
new securities accounts were opened in the Electronic Securities System 
(SAT) of the ASE in the third quarter of 1999.  
That period was marked by expectations of a general rise in prices, 
which did not take sufficiently into account the peculiarities and profitability 
prospects at the level of the business firm. It should be noted that, between 
end- July and 17th September 1999, the composite ASE index rose by 46.2 
% and that of the parallel market by 125.8 %. When the first price adjustment 
occurred in mid- September, some further problems also arose, which were 
linked to investors’ short positions in securities companies.  
For considerable time until September 1999 many investors believed that 
share prices would continue to rise. As long as investors could be sure that 
other people would follow and pump up the share prices, and so long as the 
expected capital gains alone would fulfill the high nominal return which they 
needed to justify the investment, investors cared little about the increase of 
dividends. It seems that the belief of continuous rise of share prices was 
based on the expectation that prices will continue to grow faster just because 
they did so in the past. In line with these expectations, managers came to 
think that they would not have to make efforts to raise the share price of their 
company, which left them to worry only about paying dividends. 
However, empirical evidence on the efficiency of stock prices is quite 
mixed, depending mainly on the theoretical framework chosen and the em-
pirical methodology applied. High price volatility may itself not necessar-
ily indicate a bubble, since even efficiently priced stocks tend to react 
strongly to information concerning fundamentals. As the fundamental 
value of socks is not directly observable, it is impossible to decide in par-
ticularly ex ante with certainty whether stocks are efficiently priced at a spe-
cific point in time or not. Thus any assessment concerning stock market 
efficiency requires a judgment as to whether investors' expectations about 
future dividends, interest rates and stock market are rational. Such an as-
sessment has to be based on both empirical and theoretical considera-
tions.  
Could the sharp volatility in stock prices provide an indication of market 
inefficiency? In the long run, stock price volatilities are the same, whether or 
not prices are mean reverting. In contrast, short-term volatilities, stemming 
from the influence of feedback trading, are greater if prices are mean revert-
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ing than if they are not. As a result, the ratio of long-term volatility to short 
term volatility is smaller if prices are mean reverting. However, large price 
movements themselves do not necessarily indicate a bubble, as efficiently 
priced stocks also have an inherent tendency to react strongly to news 
about fundamentals. Since there is a high degree of uncertainty when 
identifying the factors that determine the ‘fundamental’ value of an asset, 
or measuring the importance of various factors, all asset price valuation 
models tend to be uncertain and inconclusive with regard to the appropri-
ateness of any particular asset price level. 
The traditional instrument of assessing the level of stock prices usu-
ally involves examining historical data of stock valuation ratios, such as 
the dividend yield and price-earnings ratio. It is normally expected that 
these valuation ratios should, over time, eventually revert to some long-
term equilibrium level. The long-run growth potential of dividends or 
corporate earnings, the long-term levels of real interest rates and the eq-
uity risk premium are the factors that determine this equilibrium level. 
Statistically, two methods are used for historical comparisons. The first 
consists of comparing current valuation ratios with historical averages. 
The second involves an estimation of a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between stock market valuation ratios and, for example, real interest rates 
and potential output growth (as a proxy of long-term dividend growth). 
Both methods reveal a stock market over or under valuation when current 
valuation ratios diverge considerably from the estimated long-run equi-
librium level. 
However, both methods provide only insufficient evidence of a stock 
market bubble since they cannot detect whether such divergence reflects 
reactions to news about fundamentals or influence of positive feedback 
trading.  For example the initial extraordinarily high price-earnings ratios 
in the market for high-technology stocks could be justified by correct 
expectations of astonishing corporate earnings increases over an extended 
future period of time. Their subsequent decline, although observationally 
equivalent to the “bursting” of a bubble reflected largely the increased 
uncertainty as regards the short- and long-term profit prospects of business 
firms in the advanced-technology sectors (IMF, 2000). In contrast, in ASE, 
the sharp movements in equity prices were driven mainly by unrealistic 
expectations about the future growth of capital gains driving stock prices 
out of line with fundamentals, rather than on a reassessment by market 
participants of economic developments such as the prospects for eco-
nomic growth. Such behavior has resulted from; inter alia, extrapolative 
price expectations and technical trading rules.  
Although, as it has been pointed out in the former corporate governance 
section, shareholder’s value is not an objective for Greek firms, increasing 
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this value is necessary in order to buy off minority shareholders.  The con-
tinuing rise in stock prices in the late 1990s flooded companies with capital 
gains, which not only provided the resources to satisfy minority shareholders, 
but also shifted management attention away from operating profits while 
realizing more investments in unproductive activities with a potential for 
managerial empire-building. And then the huge bubble of stock prices burst 
at the end of 1999. 
5. The Impact of Stock Market on Economic Developments 
In theory the stock market may affect economic developments 
through its impact on cost of capital, wealth, confidence and balance 
sheets. An increase in stock prices may imply an increase in investment 
spending since this investment can be financed at lower cost by new is-
sues of stocks or by selling existing stocks. In fact, when stock prices 
rise, the market value of the firm relative to the replacement cost of its 
stock of capital (the so-called "Tobin's q") tends to increase, which im-
plies it would be profitable for the firm to expand its capital stock. This in 
turn leads to higher investment spending, aggregate demand and output. 
However, this effect may be weakened by several factors such as uncer-
tainty regarding the future profitability of the investment, adjustment 
costs and the irreversible nature of investment decisions - i.e. sunk costs.  
In Greece public companies were the biggest beneficiaries of the rally in 
the stock market in the mid and late 1990s. A low cost of capital meant a low 
'hurdle' for the investment encouraging these companies to care little about 
the investment returns. However, since the decline in equity prices facing a 
higher cost of capital, they suspect that they paid too much for some invest-
ments.  
The slump of the Greek stock market since September 1999 has been 
changing many of the elements that enabled the cheap finance of the late 
nineties. Investors have become more cautious about the stock investment. 
They have learned that stocks are risky assets whose prices can fall. They do 
not have any longer the illusion that stock prices will rise forever.  
Companies have paid the price for their excess finance in the past and 
managers have faced up to the true cost of equity. Equity is a source of funds 
that they do not have to reimburse, but it costs more than they used to think: 
augmenting demand from investors. Managers now see that their responsi-
bilities to their shareholders are not only dividends, but also capital gains 
which investors expect. They are realizing that they must augment the value 
of the company to raise equity price.  
The changing perception of the cost of equity may consequently affect 
the behavior of companies. These companies traditionally try to maximize 
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their market share and kill competitors first and then 'milk' the profit in the 
market that they have monopolized. Although it is difficult to judge whether 
the maximization of market share will lead to the future maximization of 
profit, it will surely take a very long time to monopolize a market. Moreover, 
heavy competition from European companies may prevent companies from 
milking the market. This may not however be the case of some Greek com-
panies in the services sector (e.g. banks), which is subject to limited competi-
tion. Such companies have the best prospects in the ASE.    
Stock prices may also affect investment and consumption via confi-
dence effects (Boone, et al. 1998). The decline in stock prices has induced 
both consumers and firms to revise downwards their expectations con-
cerning future economic activity, hurting consumer confidence, actual 
consumption spending and investment activity. Expectations have been 
affected even in the case of households that do not own stocks or firms 
that have not issued quoted shares. 
A change in stock prices may also affect economic developments via 
wealth and balance sheet effects (Bertaut, 2002). A significant increase in 
stock prices implies an increase in financial wealth leading to higher cur-
rent and future consumption, stimulating aggregate demand and output 
and vice-versa. The asymmetric information in credit markets renders the 
value of collateral an important determinant of both households’ and 
firms’ ability to borrow.  The value of collateral and the inherent risk are 
important determinants of the impact of equity price changes on invest-
ment and consumption. 
However, the last two effects of the sharp fall in stock prices were 
largely offset by significant increases in real estate prices, which also af-
fect wealth and the value of collateral. In Greece evidence indicates a 
strong negative correlation between real estate prices and equity prices as 
investors move away from the stock market in favor of the real estate 
market.  Lax bank lending conditions and practices had also been con-
tributing to the build-up of real estate price inflation. 
6. Conclusion: The Prospects 
The downward trend of share prices since September 1999 drove stock 
exchange values of companies down to unduly low levels; even lower than 
book values of companies. One would normally expect that arbitragers and 
institutional investors who pay attention to fundamental values would dis-
cover that stocks are undervalued and buy these stocks eventually causing 
prices to increase. However, this expectation would prove in line with reality 
only under the assumption that households do not possess a large share of 
stocks. This assumption does not hold. Fundamental trading has certain limi-
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tations. Borrowing constraints and short investment horizons contain the 
risk-bearing capacities of rational investors and consequently their aggre-
gate ability to drive share values close to fundamentals. Falling and highly 
volatile stock prices had a negative effect on the behavior of savers and insti-
tutional investors. Specifically, equity holdings of mutual funds and portfolio 
investment companies gradually declined since 1999, as savers and investors 
increasingly liquidated their equity-type mutual fund units, while mutual 
funds partly substituted their investments in shares listed on the ASE with 
REPOS and synthetic swaps. Stock prices are unlikely to go up by much for 
the time being, since there are many investors who bought shares at a high 
price and want to dispose of them when prices recover.   The potential exit 
from the market is enormous. 
Even more important is the fact that in a case of an inefficient market the 
results concerning capital gains or losses from buying stocks depend on lack. 
In every system that the results depend on lack, confidence on this system is 
undermined. In addition to the absence of effective corporate rules and pro-
cedures to insure minority protection and with corporate control in the hands 
of insiders, investors and potential investors refrain from buying shares. The 
prospects of recovery in the ASE look bleak. 
The market incorporates an automatic mechanism of correction tend-
ing to eliminate a situation of excessive degree of managerial discretion 
enjoyed by the controlling shareholder. On the investors’ side weakness 
in minority protection affects access to finance and cost of equity capital. 
The present depressed state of the Greek capital market also limits the “exit” 
option available to holders of minority stakes and makes them reluctant to 
invest in shares. The vicious circle is well evident. On the companies’ side, 
it is the punishment of the stock market that now is increasingly subject-
ing management to corporate governance. Companies pay the price for 
their excess finance in the past and managers become more aware of the true 
cost of equity. In the long term the degree of minority protection reflects 
on the capital structure of firms. At present managers and controlling 
owners are more willing to take out bank loans because of their availabil-
ity and low cost in comparison to equity financing. As it has been pointed 
out own funds of companies that have issued quoted shares experienced 
since 2001 a decline, while their total liabilities (due to bank lending) in-
creased. Preference for debt over equity gradually restores the original 
balance in the capital structure of firms and enhances the monitoring role 
provided by banks stifling the controlling owners’ managerial discretion. 
In addition mergers and acquisition of public companies increased sub-
stantially and some of them consider even de-listing from the ASE; an 
action, which would affect the supply and eventually the price of shares. 
However, the market process is slow and painful. 
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The process is so painful that some people turn to the government, which 
was responded by announcing supporting measures for the stock market. 
More specifically, the authorities took several measures deregulating credit 
to natural persons for the purchase of a large number of shares (,) provided. 
This will result in their acquiring a holding of at least 5 per cent of a firm’s 
capital, while the former provisions allowed financing only for gaining con-
trol of a company. Furthermore, natural persons were offered the option to 
borrow on collateral of securities already held in their portfolio and not only 
of shares purchased with the proceeds of the loan. Bank credit to investment 
firms and securities companies  were also liberalized, while the number of 
companies to be listed  in the ASE was reduced. Such remedies, however, are 
dangerous. Easy finance is like a drug since it will ease temporarily the pain 
of the disease but would delay the necessary adjustment, instead of promot-
ing it. Capital is a scare resource, which managers should use efficiently. 
The changing perception of the cost of equity may affect the behavior of 
companies. However, this may not be the case of companies operating in the 
services sector, which is subject to limited competition. These companies are 
able to maximize their market share and 'milk' the profit in the market they 
monopolized and therefore have the best prospects in the ASE. 
The measures announced by the government also cover a wide range of 
institutional, organizational and operational issues, such as the improved in-
stitutional framework of the Capital Market Committee and the ASE, the 
enhanced transparency of stock market trading, and the supervision of listed 
companies, particularly as regards the supply of information, the transactions 
of their major shareholders and the observance by the latter of ASE regula-
tions. In addition new laws intended to strengthened minority protection 
were introduced. The emphasis is to increase the liability of directors, acti-
vate institutional investors in corporate governance and encourage mergers 
and acquisitions. For instance, Law 3016/2002 stipulates that at least one 
third of the members of the board should be non-executive members without 
financial stakes and at least two of these non-executive members should be 
independent members.  
Are these enough to persuade minority shareholders that they will not be 
exploited by controlling owners?  The mechanism to achieve good corporate 
governance was left to factors internal to the firm, without external pressures 
and sanctions to force effective adoption. A number of specific control tech-
niques, such as crossholding, have not been restricted while issuers and con-
trolling owners may develop procedures circumventing various controls. For 
instance, the composition of the boards of directors are less important since 
outside directors would not be expected to take independent action when the 
controlling owner can hire and fire them at will through his influence in the 
general meetings. The new legislation on takeovers instead of fostering take-
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over activity would allow controlling shareholders to reinforce their posi-
tions. The bulk of transactions will take place outside the official stock mar-
ket. The market for corporate control continues to operate under the enter-
prise-based principles. However, with such a corporate governance and 
declining corporate’ profits, companies are unable to placate once again 
investors.  
The revival of the ASE and consequently an increase in investment 
spending requires attempts to open up the market by introducing elements of 
company-based system designed to protect minority interests. As long as 
takeovers are used merely as device to withdraw firms from the stock ex-
change and take place through trading in large blocks outside the public ex-
change, the role of the market and the discipline it can provide in a modern 
economic system is undermined, leading to misallocation and misuse of eco-
nomic resources. The Greek law should encourage hostile takeovers through 
purchases in the official stock market as an instrument to change control, 
protecting investors against the abuses of management and enhancing market 
discipline in the system.   
At present, poor law enforcement also contributes to weakness of 
minority protection. To enhance investors’ confidence in the market and 
make finance more readily and cheaply available, minority shareholders 
should be given stronger legal rights to mount class suits as in the US.  
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